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forfeit "his right to be present during the delivery of the
additional instructions [to the jury] by leaving the courthouse
during deliberations despite instructions to remain in the
building." 903
Under both the federal and state constitutions, the defendant
has a right to be present during supplemental jury instructions by
the court. However, this right may be forfeited if the defendant
deliberately absents himself from the proceedings. Thus, before
the court may proceed with the supplemental jury instructions it
must make a finding, based on the surrounding circumstances,
that the defendant's absence is, in fact, deliberate.
FOURTHDEPARTMENT
904
People v. Williams

(decided February 1, 1991)

A criminal defendant claimed that his right to be present at all
material stages of his trial, pursuant to the confrontation clauses
of the federal 905 and state 9° 6 constitutions, was violated when his
trial was held in his absence. The court held that the "defendant's
non-appearance constituted a waiver of his right to be present at
trial." ' 907 Thus, the defendant's conviction of grand larceny in

908
the third degree was affirmed.
On May 5, 1988, the trial court informed the defendant, Albert
Williams, that his trial would be conducted eleven days later. 90 9
The court further informed Williams that his presence was required, but that the trial would proceed in his absence should he

defendant's absence before proceeding with trial), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d
852, 561 N.E.2d 891, 560 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1990).
903. People v. Watson, 121 A.D.2d 487, 487, 503 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (2d
Dep't 1986).
904. 170 A.D.2d 968, 566 N.Y.S.2d 135 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 77
N.Y.2d 968, 573 N.E.2d 590, 570 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1991).
905. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

906. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
907. Williams, 170 A.D.2d at 969, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 136.

908. Id. at 968, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
909. Id. at 968, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
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fail to appear. 910 The court cautioned that due to the possible unavailability of three prosecution witnesses, of which two were
nonresidents, no adjournments would be granted. 9 11 Williams ac9 12
knowledged that he understood the court's warning.
On the day his case was called for trial, Wiliams did not appear. His counsel informed the court that she received a message
that Williams was sick, but her attempts to contact him proved
9 13
fruitless. An adjournment was granted until the following day.
When the defendant failed to appear the following day, and his
counsel noted that she received no replies to the messages she
left, the court proceeded with the trial in Williams' absence. The
court reasoned that since Williams had been previously informed
of the trial date and the consequences of his nonappearance, it
9 14
could proceed with his trial.
The fourth department, in a brief decision, affirmed the trial
court's conviction. 9 15 The court acknowledged that under the
confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions the
defendant "has a fundamental right to be present at all material
stages of a trial.", 916 The court, relying primarily on People v.
Parker,9 17 also noted that the right may be waived. However, in
order for such waiver to be effective, it must be made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 9 18 In order to effectuate
such a waiver, the court stated that the defendant "must, at a
910. Id.
911. Id.
912. Id. ('he court inquired: "Of course, the trial could be held without
you, you understand that?" The defendant readily acknowledged that he
understood.).

913. Id.
914. Id.

915. Id.
916. Id. at 968-69, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 136; see also People v. Mehmedi, 69
N.Y.2d 759, 760, 505 N.E.2d 610, 611, 513 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (1987).

917. 57 N.Y.2d 136, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 454 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982).
918. Williams, 170 A.D.2d at 969, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 136; see also Parker,
57 N.Y.2d at 139, 440 N.E.2d at 1315, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 969; People v. Epps,
37 N.Y.2d 343, 349-50, 334 N.E.2d 556, 571, 372 N.Y.S.2d 606, 612, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1975); People v. Quamina, 161 A.D.2d 1110, 1111,

555 N.Y.S.2d 973, 974 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 943, 564
N.E.2d 682, 563 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1990).
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minimum, be informed in some manner of the nature of the right
to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear for
trial. "919 This, the court found, "requires that defendant simply

be aware the trial will proceed even though he or she fails to
appear. "

92 0

However, trial by absentia is not automatically authorized once
the court finds that the defendant has waived his or her right to
be present. The Parker court laid out "appropriate factors" that
the trial court must consider before the trial may proceed without
the defendant: "[T]he possibility that defendant could be located
within a reasonable period of time, the difficulty of rescheduling
the trial and the chance that evidence will be lost or witnesses
will disappear." 92 1 Comparing the record to these factors, the
court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in proceeding in Williams' absence. 922 The court noted: that the trial
court delayed the trial for one day to allow Williams the opportunity to be present; that Williams' attorney offered no reasonable
explanation for his absence; and that there was the possibility of
lost prosecution witnesses should further delay occur. 923
Under federal law, it has long been recognized that "[o]ne of
the most basic rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is
the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage
of his trial." 924 However, this right, like any other constitutional

919. Williams, 170 A.D.2d at 969, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (quoting Parker,
57 N.Y.2d at 141, 440 N.E.2d at 1316, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 970).
920. Id.; see also Quamina, 161 A.D.2d at 1111, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 974
(record must show defendant was aware trial would proceed even if defendant
failed to appear); cf People v. Sanchez, 65 N.Y.2d 436, 443-44, 482 N.E.2d
56, 59-60, 492 N.Y.S.2d 577, 580-81 (1985) (if "defendant deliberately
leaves the courtroom after his trial has begun, he forfeits his right to be present
at trial regardless of whether he knows that the trial will continue in his
absence").
921. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 142, 440 N.E.2d at 1317, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
922. Williams, 170 A.D.2d at 968, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
923. Id.
924. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); see United States v.
Mera, 921 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930,
933 (2d Cir. 1977).
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guarantee, may be waived. 925 As a general rule, in order for a
waiver to be effective it must be made knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently. 926 This may be accomplished when a defendant
"deliberately absent[s] himself from the trial without good
cause."

92 7

In United States v. Tortora,9 2 8 the Second Circuit

925. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 18 & n.1-2 (1973). In
Taylor, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part: "In prosecutions for
offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the
trial has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial
to and including the return of the verdict." Id. Consequently, the Court
affirmed the lower court's holding, finding that the petitioner knew that he was
entitled to be present in court and that he voluntarily chose not to attend. Id.
The Taylor Court relied on the earlier holding of Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442 (1912), in which the court stated:
[Where the offense is not capital and the accused is not in custody, the
prevailing rule has been, that if, after the trial has begun in his
presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify what has
been done or prevent the completion of the trial, but, on the contrary,
operates as a waiver of his right to be present and leaves the court free
to proceed ....
Diaz, 223 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added); accord Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 106 (1934) ("No doubt the privilege may be lost by consent
...

"); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1208 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) ("[w]ithout this obligation on the accused the
disposition of criminal cases would be subject to the whims of defendants who
could frustrate the speedy satisfaction of justice by absenting themselves from
their trials."). Infact, the Tortoracourt was one of the first to apply the Diaz
waiver rule when the defendant had absented himself after a not guilty plea,
but before the impanelment of the jury. Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1208.
926. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."); see also Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1208 ("[w]aiver of a constitutional
right must be both 'knowing' and 'voluntary"').
927. Pastor, 557 F.2d at 933; see also Diaz, 223 U.S. at 455. Waiver may
also be implied from a defendant's conduct. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970), the Court reversed the lower court's holding that defendant had been
deprived of his constitutional right when the trial court removed him from his
own trial because of his disruptive conduct, and continued the trial in his
absence. Allen, 397 U.S. at 345-47. The Allen Court held that, under the
circumstances, Allen waived his "right guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to be present throughout his trial." Allen, 397 U.S. at 346.
928. 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
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Court of Appeals held that when a defendant deliberately fails to
appear in court his absence will be considered a knowing
waiver. 929 Thus, "[wfhen a trial judge designates a date for trial
the defendant's obligation is to appear ready in the court on that
date." ' 930 However, before the trial may proceed in the
defendant's absence, the judge must determine that the defendant
had "adequate notice of the charges and proceedings against
him. " 93

1

Still, the Tortora court refused to lay down as a general rule
that the judge should proceed with the trial where a defendant has
voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings. Instead, the
judge should use his or her discretion, which should be exercised,
to hold the trust in defendant's absence, "only when the public
interest clearly outweighs that of the voluntarily absent defendant.,"932 In doing so, the judge should consider factors such as
"the likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the defendant present[,] the difficulty of rescheduling [and] the burden
on the Government [and the witnesses]. 933
Therefore, under both the federal and state constitutions the defendant's right to be present at all material stages of his or her
trial may be waived. However, a trial may not automatically be
tried in absentia once waiver is established. The decision to hold
a trial in absentia is committed to the discretion of the trial judge.
In order to determine whether a trial in absentia is appropriate,
the judge should consider factors which weigh the rights of the
defendant against the need to proceed with the trial as scheduled.
If satisfied, only then does a trial in absentia comport with the re929. Id. at 1208 ("The deliberate absence of a defendant who knows that he
stands accused in a criminal case and that the trial will begin on a day certain

indicates nothing less than an intention to obstruct the orderly processes of
justice."). Id.
930. Id. ("No defendant has a unilateral right to set the time of circumstances under which he will be tried."). Id.
931. Id. at 1209. The record should show that the defendant was "advised
when the proceedings were to commence and that he voluntarily, knowingly,

and without justification failed to be present at the designated time and place
.....
Id.
932. Id. at 1210.

933. Id.
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spective state and federal constitutional guarantees afforded the
defendant.
People v. Ortega 93 4
(decided July 12, 1991)

A criminal defendant contended that his right to be present with
counsel under the federal 9 35 and state 936 constitutions, as well as
his state statutory rights, were violated when the court held an in
chamber conference with the prosecution's key witness absent the
defendant and all counsel. 937 The appellate division held that the
trial court's ex parte conference with Officer Fritzen, a key
witness for the prosecution, violated the defendant's right to be
present with counsel at all important stages of the trial. 9 38 The
court stated that since the defendant's guilt or innocence was at
issue, "the decision whether [an] informant's identity should be
939
disclosed must not be resolved in an ex parte proceeding."
The defendant, Ortega, was convicted by a jury, of second and
third degree criminal sale of a controlled substance as well as two
counts of possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
The conviction resulted from a sale of cocaine to an undercover
police officer introduced to the defendant by a confidential informant. During the trial, the defendant's repeated requests for
disclosure of the informant's identity were denied. Upon crossexamination by defense counsel, police officer Fritzen, chief witness for the prosecution, refused to disclose the identity of the informant who accompanied him when he purchased the cocaine
from the defendant. The court, in an attempt to resolve the issue,
conducted an in camera conference in chambers with Officer
Fritzen without the knowledge or consent of either side. Again,
Fritzen refused to identify the informant. Subsequently, the court
934. 572 N.Y.S.2d 241 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 78 N.Y.2d 1101, 585 N.E.2d
372, 578 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1991).
935. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
936. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
937. Ortega, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
938. Id. The court's holding was based on People v. Insogna, 28 A.D.2d
771, 773, 281 N.Y.S.2d 124, 128 (3d Dep't 1967).

939. Ortega, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
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